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ABSTRACT
Many view the period after the Second Industrial Revolution as a paradigmatic example of a tran-
sition to a new economy following a technological revolution and conjecture that this historical
experience is useful for understanding other transitions, including that after the Information Tech-
nology Revolution. We build a model of diﬀusion and growth to study transitions. We quantify the
learning process in our model using data on the life cycle of U.S. manufacturing plants. This model
accounts quantitatively for the productivity paradox, the slow diﬀusion of new technologies, and
the ongoing investment in old technologies after the Second Industrial Revolution. The main lesson
from our model for the Information Technology Revolution is that the nature of transition following
a technological revolution depends on the historical context: transition and diﬀusion are slow only
if agents have built up through learning a large amount of knowledge about old technologies before
the transition begins.
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for research support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.The period 1860—1900 is often called the Second Industrial Revolution because of the
large number of technologies invented during that time. Historians argue that the Second
Industrial Revolution launched a century-long period of rapid development of new manufac-
turing technologies based on electricity (Schurr et al. 1960, Rosenberg 1976, Devine 1983,
and David 1990, 1991). This increase in the pace of technical change led eventually to a
new economy, characterized by faster growth in manufacturing productivity, as measured by
output per hour.
That particular transition to a new economy is viewed by many as paradigmatic of
what happens after any major and sustained increase in the pace of technical change. The
transition has three main features: a productivity paradox, a surprisingly long delay between
the increase in the pace of technical change and the increase in the growth rate of measured
productivity; slow diﬀusion of new technologies;a n dcontinued investment in old technologies.
David (1990) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) have argued that all three of these features
of the transition after the Second Industrial Revolution have parallels in the transition after
the more recent Information Technology Revolution.
Why did the transition after the Second Industrial Revolution have these features?
And are they likely to be seen in other such transitions? Here we attempt to answer those
questions by building a model of technology diﬀusion and growth that is intended to capture
the main elements of the historians’ hypotheses about the technological constraints facing
manufacturing plants that are thought to have shaped the transition to a new economy after
the Second Industrial Revolution. These are that new technologies are embodied in plants,
so that plants must be redesigned in order to use the new technologies; that improvements in
the technologies for new plants are ongoing; and that new plants require a period of learning
in order to use the new technologies. (See, for example, Schurr et al. 1960, Rosenberg 1976,
Devine 1983, and David 1990, 1991.) We use this model to investigate what aspects of these
technological constraints are critical quantitatively for generating this transition’s three main
features. We then use the model to ask what lessons can be learned from the transition after
the Second Industrial Revolution to guide research on the Information Technology Revolution.
One lesson is that learning about each new embodied technology must be both sub-
stantial and protracted if the model is to reproduce the main features of the transition afterthe Second Industrial Revolution: a productivity paradox, a slow and S-shaped diﬀusion curve
for new embodied technologies, and substantial ongoing investment in old technologies.
Our model generates a productivity paradox only if at the start of the transition agents
have built up through learning a large stock of knowledge about old embodied technologies.
This happens in our model if the learning process in the old economy is substantial and
protracted relative to the pace of technical change for new embodied technologies. In this
case, agents ﬁnd it worthwhile to spend a long time learning about an existing technology
before abandoning it in favor of a new embodied technology.
By the same logic, learning and built-up knowledge are critical for generating a slow
diﬀusion of new technologies. Our model generates S-shaped diﬀusion curves from hetero-
geneity across plants in built-up knowledge about old technologies: plants with little built-up
knowledge adopt the new technology sooner, while plants with a lot of built-up knowledge
adopt the new technology later.
Finally, when learning is substantial and protracted, our model also generates ongoing
investment in old technologies even after new technologies are introduced. This ongoing
investment occurs because existing plants embodying old technologies continue to learn and
thus grow by adding physical capital and labor for quite some time after new technologies
are introduced.
One of our main contributions in making the model quantitative is to use micro data
on the life cycle patterns of plants in the U.S. economy–their birth, growth, and death–to
infer the parameters of the learning process at the plant level. Our method here builds on
the work of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2005). From these
micro data on manufacturing plants, we discover that the learning process at the plant level
is substantial and protracted. Indeed, we ﬁnd that this learning continues for at least 20
years.
When the parameters of our model are set using our method for inferring learning,
the model’s predictions match the three main features of the transition after the Second
Industrial Revolution surprisingly well. We ﬁnd it intriguing that the model matches these
data so well even though we did not attempt to replicate any features of the transition after
the Second Industrial Revolution when we chose the parameters of our model.
2Our method of measuring learning at the plant level contrasts sharply with the stan-
dard approach in the learning literature, exempliﬁed by the work of Bahk and Gort (1993).
These researchers associate learning in a plant with changes in the average productivity of
labor and capital at that plant as the plant ages. This method leads to the conclusion that
there is very little learning at the plant level and, hence, if used with our model would predict
fast transitions, fast diﬀusion of new technologies, and little or no ongoing investment in old
technologies.
We argue in favor of our method of measuring learning because, in the context of our
model, the method proposed by Bahk and Gort (1993) is conceptually ﬂawed. Indeed, if it
were applied to our model, it would ﬁnd no learning at all, regardless of how much learning was
actually going on. Our method for measuring learning is one of the features that distinguish
our work from related models of transition based on embodiment and learning, including
those of Hornstein and Krusell (1996) and Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997).
What lessons can be drawn from our model for the transition following the more
recent Information Technology Revolution? We investigate this question by following the
lead of David (1990), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002), and others who argued that
information technologies are similar to electricity in that they open up new possibilities for
organizing business practices within organizations and that these organizations need to be
redesigned to make productive use of these new information technologies. Motivated by this
work, we reinterpret our model as having business organizations rather than manufacturing
plants as the basic units of production. We assume that each new business organization
embodies a new set of business practices that represent the current frontier of such practices
and then learns to become more productive with these practices over time.
The main lesson we draw is that our model’s implications for the transition after a
technological revolution depend on the historical context in which that revolution occurs.
In particular, our model predicts a slow transition only if agents have accumulated through
learning a large stock of built-up knowledge of old technologies before the transition begins.
For the Second Industrial Revolution, we argue that agents did have a large stock of built-up
knowledge about factories based on steam and waterpower. For the IT Revolution, our model
will predict a slow transition only if at the start of that revolution agents had a large stock
3of built-up knowledge about business practices based on old information technologies.
We use the model to examine which factors determine the extent of built-up knowledge
in equilibrium. We show that the faster the pace of technical change in the old economy,
the smaller the extent of built-up knowledge, and hence the faster the transition after a
technological revolution. We also show that the more protracted and substantial the learning
process, the larger the extent of built-up knowledge and the slower the transition after a
technological revolution.
Currently, there are little data on the extent of built-up knowledge about business
practices in organizations at the start of the IT Revolution. Our model, however, suggests
that the extent of built-up knowledge about business practices can be inferred from data on
the diﬀusion and life cycle of business practices. To generate quantitatively a slow transition
following the IT Revolution in our model, we must assume that the diﬀusion of business
practices before that revolution was very slow and that the life cycle of these business prac-
tices was very prolonged. For example, for our model to generate a transition after the IT
Revolution that is as slow as that after the Second Industrial Revolution, at the start of
the IT Revolution over 50 percent of the workforce must be employed in organizations with
business practices that are more than six decades old.
At the general level, the technology diﬀusion in our model is related to the theoretical
literature on S-shaped diﬀusion curves, including the work of Jovanovic and Lach (1989)
and Chari and Hopenhayn (1991). In contrast to these papers, we have neither spillovers of
learning nor complementarities. Our model diﬀers from most of the literature on diﬀusion in
that it generates substantial ongoing investment in old technologies. (An important exception
is Chari and Hopenhayn 1991.)
More recent theoretical work on diﬀusion after a major technical change includes that
of Aghion and Howitt (1998), Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998), and Laitner and Stolyarov
(2003). In this literature, often referred to as work on general purpose technologies, the
diﬀusion of a major new technology is constrained by the need to develop complementary
inputs for that technology. These explanations for the slow diﬀusion of new technologies do
not account for substantial investment in old technologies following major technical change.
41. A Paradigmatic Transition to a New Economy
Many historians view the transition to a new economy after the Second Industrial
Revolution as a paradigmatic example of a transition to a new economy after a major and
sustained increase in the pace of technical change. Here we document the three main features
of this transition: a productivity paradox, slow diﬀusion of new technologies, and ongoing
investment in old technologies.
Many of the technologies that had a profound impact on living standards in the 20th
century were invented between 1860 and 1900. These technologies include electricity, the
internal combustion engine, the production of petroleum and other chemicals, telephones and
radios, and indoor plumbing. (For a description of technological inventions during this time,
see the work of Gordon 2000a.) Although all of these inventions undoubtedly had a substantial
economic impact, we follow Schurr et al. (1960, 1990), Rosenberg (1976), Devine (1983), and
David (1990, 1991) and focus on the new technologies based on electricity. These historians
have argued that this revolution launched a century-long period of rapid development of new
technologies for manufacturing based on electricity (Devine 1990).
In Figure 1 we show there was a productivity paradox, or a substantial lag between
the increased pace of technical change and the response of measured productivity growth.1
We have computed linear trends in annual output per hour in U.S. manufacturing for three
periods: 1869—99, 1899—1929, and 1949—69. (We chose these periods to omit the Great
Depression and World War II; data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, 1973.) The
trend growth rate of output per hour in the three periods increases gradually, from 1.6 percent
to 2.6 percent to 3.3 percent. (We chose 1869 as the starting point because the early data
are derived from the U.S. Census Bureau’s censuses of manufacturing establishments, which
have been taken every decade since that year. We focus on the subsequent 100-year period.
Gordon (2000b) documents a similar gradual acceleration for the growth of output per hour
for the U.S. economy as a whole.)
In documenting the slow diﬀusion of new technologies, we focus on the diﬀusion of
electric power in manufacturing over the period 1869—1939. In Figure 2 we plot the per-
centages of mechanical power in U.S. manufacturing establishments that were derived from
water, steam, and electricity during 1869—1939 (Devine 1983, Table 3). Before 1899, more
5than 95 percent of mechanical power was derived from water and steam. Between 1899 and
1929, electricity use gradually replaced water and steam, so that by 1929, over 75 percent
of mechanical power was electric. If we measure the diﬀusion of electricity in manufacturing
starting in 1869, we see that it took 50 years for electricity to provide 50 percent of mechanical
power. This measure of the speed of diﬀusion is sensitive to the choice of starting date. A
measure of the speed of diﬀusion that is less sensitive to that choice is the time required for
a technology to diﬀuse from 5 percent to 50 percent. For electricity in U.S. manufacturing,
such diﬀusion took place over about 20 years, from 1899 to 1919.
In documenting the ongoing investment in old technologies, we focus on the ongoing
growth of steam power over the period 1869—1939. Figure 2 shows that the percentage of
mechanical power derived from steam increased from roughly 50 percent in 1869 to roughly
80 percent in 1899. Given that the total amount of mechanical power in U.S. manufacturing
increased over this time period, these data imply that there was substantial net new invest-
ment in steam power for at least 30 years following the development of electric power. To
put the diﬀusion paths of these three types of power in a longer-term perspective, recall that
waterpower is an extremely old technology, while steam power started diﬀusing in the United
States between 1800 and 1810 (Atack, Bateman, and Weiss 1980). During the period 1800—
1899, waterpower slowly gave way to steam power, and only after that did electric power
gradually replace both of these older technologies.
2. A Model of Technology Diﬀusion
Now we present our quantitative general equilibrium model of the diﬀusion of new
technologies and the corresponding impact of these technologies on economic growth. We
build in three assumptions meant to capture historians’ hypotheses about the technolog-
ical constraints faced by manufacturers during the transition after the Second Industrial
Revolution.2
• New plants embody new technologies.3 This assumption is motivated by the work of
Devine (1983, 1990) and David (1990, 1991), who argue that manufacturing plants
needed to be completely redesigned in order to make good use of the new technologies
stemming from the development of electric power.
6• Improvements in the technology for new plants are ongoing.S p e c i ﬁcally, we model
the transition to a new economy after the Second Industrial Revolution as arising
from a once-and-for-all increase in the rate of improvement in the frontier technology
embodied in the design of new plants. This assumption captures the arguments of
Schurr et al. (1960), Rosenberg (1976), Devine (1990), and Sonenblum (1990) that
the process of improving eﬃciency through changes in factory design after the Second
Industrial Revolution continued for decades, through at least the 1980s, and lay behind
the new economy after this revolution.
• New plants improve their technology through a period of learning. This assumption is
consistent with a broad body of work on learning as well as the discussions of David
(1990, 1991) and Chandler (1992).
In describing our model formally below, we look to build in these assumptions in
abstract terms so that, with a simple reinterpretation, the model can be applied to a variety
of transition experiences. Here we interpret the elements of the model with an eye toward
applying it to the transition following the Second Industrial Revolution. Later we discuss how
to interpret the elements of the model to apply it to the transition following the Information
Technology Revolution.
2.1 The Basic Structure
In the model, time is discrete and is denoted by periods t =0 ,1,.... The economy




t log(ct),w h e r eβ is the discount factor. Each household consists of a worker
and a manager, each of whom supplies one unit of labor inelastically. Households are also
endowed with the initial stock of physical capital and ownership of the plants that exist in
period 0. Given sequences of wages for workers, wages for managers, and intertemporal prices
{wt,w mt,p t}
∞
t=0, initial capital holdings k0, and an initial value a0 of the plants that exist in
period 0, households choose sequences of consumption {ct}
∞







pt(wt + wmt)+k0 + a0. (1)
7Production in this economy is carried out in plants. In any period, a plant is char-
acterized by its speciﬁc productivity A and its age s. To operate, a plant uses one unit of
a manager’s time, physical capital, and (workers’) labor as variable inputs. If a plant with





where the function F is linearly homogeneous of degree 1 and the parameter γ ∈ (0,1). The
technology parameter z is common to all plants and grows at an exogenous rate. We call
z economy-wide productivity. Following Lucas (1978, p. 511), we call γ the span of control
parameter of the plant’s manager. Here the parameter γ may be interpreted as determining
the degree of diminishing returns at the plant level. We refer to the pair (A,s) as the
plant’s organization-speciﬁc capital, or simply its organization capital. This pair summarizes
the built-up expertise, or knowledge, that distinguishes one organization from another. In
(2), the exponent (1 − γθ)/θ on A is a convenient scaling of speciﬁc productivity.
Each plant produces a diﬀerentiated product, which a competitive ﬁrm aggregates to
produce a homogeneous ﬁnal good. Each plant chooses its price and inputs to maximize
proﬁts given the downward-sloping demand from the ﬁrm that produces ﬁnal goods. The











where λt(A,s) denotes the measure of plants with organization capital (A,s)t h a to p e r a t ei n
t.The ﬁnal goods ﬁrm has a static demand function qt(A)=pt(A)−1/(1−θ)yt.N o t et h a t w e
use a symmetry property of the equilibrium: independently of age, all operating plants with
the same speciﬁc productivity A choose the same output and set the same price. We also
normalize the price of the ﬁnal good to be 1.
The timing of events in period t is as follows. An owner’s decision whether to operate a
plant is made at the beginning of the period. Plants that do not operate produce nothing; the
organization capital in these plants is lost permanently. Plants with organization capital (A,s)
that do operate, in contrast, hire a manager, capital kt, and labor lt and produce output q
8according to (2). At the end of the period, operating plants draw independent innovations (or
shocks)   to their speciﬁc productivity, with probabilities given by age-dependent distributions
{πs}. Thus, a plant with organization capital (A,s) that operates in period t has stochastic
organization capital (A ,s +1 )at the beginning of period t +1 .
Consider the process by which a new plant enters the economy. Before a new plant can
enter in period t, a manager must spend period t− 1 preparing and adopting a blueprint for
constructing the plant that determines the plant’s initial speciﬁc productivity τt.B l u e p r i n t s
adopted in period t − 1 embody the frontier of knowledge (or frontier blueprint) regarding
the design of plants at that point in time. This frontier evolves exogenously, according to the
sequence {τt}
∞
t=0. Thus, a plant built in t−1 starts period t with initial speciﬁc productivity
τt and organization capital (A,s)=( τt,0). Because this level of productivity is built into
the plant at its start, we refer to growth in τt as embodied technical change.
We assume that capital and labor are freely mobile across plants in each period. Thus,
for any plant that operates in period t, the decision of how much capital and labor to hire is
static. Given a rental rate for capital rt, a wage rate for labor wt, and a managerial wage wmt,
the operating plant chooses employment of capital and labor to maximize variable proﬁts
dt(A)=m a x
p,q,k,l
pq − rtk − wtl (3)
subject to (2) and the static demand function. Let pt(A),q t(A),k t(A),a n dlt(A) denote the
s o l u t i o n st ot h i sp r o b l e m .
The decision whether to operate a plant is dynamic. This decision problem is described
by the Bellman equation
Vt(A,s)=m a x
"





Vt+1(A ,s +1 ) πs+1(d )
#
, (4)
where the sequences {τt,w t,r t,w mt,p t}
∞
t=0 are given. The value Vt(A,s) is the expected
discounted stream of returns to the owner of a plant with organization capital (A,s).T h i s
value is the maximum of the returns from closing the plant and those from operating it.
The second term in the brackets on the right side of (4) is the expected discounted value of
operating a plant of type (A,s). It consists of current returns dt(A)−wmt and the discounted
9value of expected future returns Vt+1(A,s). The plant operates only if the expected returns
from operating it are nonnegative.
An owner’s decision whether to hire a manager to prepare a blueprint for a new plant
is also dynamic. In period t, this decision is determined by the equation V 0
t = −wmt +
pt+1Vt+1(τt+1,0)/pt. The value V 0
t is the expected stream of returns to the owner of a new
plant, net of the initial ﬁxed cost wmt of paying a manager to prepare the blueprint for the
plant. Managers are hired to prepare blueprints for new plants only if V 0
t ≥ 0. Since there is
free entry into the activity of starting new plants, in equilibrium we require that V 0
t φt =0 ,
where φt is the measure of managers starting new plants.
Let kt denote the aggregate physical capital stock. Then the resource constraints for








A lt(A)λt(dA,s)=1 . The
resource constraint for aggregate output is ct+kt+1 = yt+(1−δ)kt,w h e r eδ is the depreciation





An equilibrium is deﬁned in the obvious way. In this equilibrium, in each period t, the
decision to operate a plant is summarized by an age-dependent cutoﬀ rule A∗
t(s). In period
t, plants of age s with speciﬁc productivity A ≥ A∗
t(s) continue operating, and those with
A<A ∗
t(s) close.
To get a sense of the process for the birth, growth, and death–or the life cycle–of
plants that our model generates, consider Figure 3. Here we show the evolution of the speciﬁc
productivity of two plants that both enter in period t = 1860. Both of these plants start
with productivity equal to that of the frontier blueprint in 1860, namely, τ1860. This frontier
blueprint grows exogenously over time at a constant rate, as shown by the solid straight
line labeled log τt. The two plants each experience random shocks to their plant-speciﬁc
productivity drawn from age-dependent distributions πs. Plant 1 is relatively lucky in that it
draws especially favorable shocks to its speciﬁc productivity, and plant 2 is relatively unlucky.
In every period, each plant makes a decision whether to continue or to close, or exit.
This decision is based on a comparison of the plant’s current speciﬁc productivity At and its
future prospects for learning, determined by the age-dependent distributions πs relative to
the alternative of exiting and starting a new plant with the current frontier blueprint. The
age-dependent cutoﬀ rule A∗
t(s) summarizes the decision. Plant 1 has relatively high speciﬁc
10productivity; hence, it exits only after operating 30 years. Plant 2 has relatively low speciﬁc
productivity and exits much sooner. After these plants exit, the manager of each plant starts
a new plant with the current frontier blueprint and begins the process of building up speciﬁc
productivity in the new plant.4
In our model, technologies embodied in plants diﬀuse throughout the economy as
new plants embodying these technologies are born and grow. Figure 3 also illustrates the
mechanics of this diﬀusion. In 1863, the manager of plant 2 decides to exit and start a new
plant that embodies the frontier blueprint of 1864 and then begins to learn with that new
technology. Likewise, in 1890 the manager of plant 1 decides to exit and start a new plant that
embodies the frontier blueprint of 1891 and then begins to learn with that new technology.
In this manner, new plants embodying new technologies gradually replace old ones. Since our
model has many such plants, each with diﬀerent shocks to speciﬁc productivity, this diﬀusion
of new embodied technologies occurs smoothly over time.
Formally, we measure the diﬀusion of embodied technologies as follows. Let lt,s =
R





be the fraction of labor employed in plants of age k and younger. We measure the diﬀusion
in period t + k of embodied technologies developed in period t or later by Dt,t+k,w h i c h ,i n
the model, is the fraction of labor employed in plants using technologies developed in period
t or later.
2.2 Measuring the Learning Process
In our model the process governing learning is a key determinant of the rate at which
a new technology diﬀuses. In the model learning at the plant level is represented by shocks
to the plant’s speciﬁc productivity. We argue here that data on plant size can be used
to measure these shocks.5 We then contrast our approach to measuring learning with the
standard approach taken in the literature on learning.
11A. The Link Between Plant Size and Plant-Speciﬁc Productivity
Our model implies a tight link between plant size and plant-speciﬁc productivity.
Given this link, we can use data on the relative size of plants to infer the actual pattern of
productivity changes, or learning, at the plant level.
To see the link between plant size and productivity, consider the static problem of
allocating a given amount of capital and labor across plants at a point in time. For a given









AAλt(dA,s) is the aggregate
of the speciﬁc productivities across all plants. The variable nt(A) measures the relative
size of the plant in terms of its capital or labor, in that the equilibrium allocations are
kt(A)=nt(A)kt and lt(A)=nt(A)lt.
A similar result holds for cohorts of plants. To see this result, deﬁne the aggregate of
the speciﬁc productivities of a cohort of plants of age s as ¯ At,s =
R
AAλt(dA,s). Note from
(6) that ¯ At,s/ ¯ At =
R
A nt(A)λt(dA,s). We then have the following proposition.
Proposition. The aggregate of speciﬁc productivities of plants of age s relative to that of all






Given this proposition, we can use the data on employment shares by cohorts, lt,s, to
infer the pattern of learning, as measured by ¯ At,s/ ¯ At. The data show that employment in a
cohort of plants grows substantially as the cohort ages. For example, in terms of the cross
section, the 1988 panel of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database (LRD)
shows that the employment share of plants rises at least for the ﬁrst 20 years of a plant’s life
and that the employment share of a cohort of plants of age 20 is more than seven times that
of the cohort of brand-new plants.6 In terms of the panel evidence, Jensen, McGuckin, and
Stiroh (2001) show that the employment share of a cohort of plants starts small and grows
steadily with age.
From the perspective of our model, the LRD data imply that the aggregate of speciﬁc
productivities of a cohort of plants grows faster than aggregate productivity for at least 20
12years. Since in the data the employment share of a cohort of plants of age 20 is more than
seven times that of brand-new plants, our model implies that plants that survive 20 years
have, at that age, learned so much that they are not only much more productive than they
were when they were ﬁrst built, but also much more productive than plants brand-new in
that 20th year. Thus, for a relatively long period of time, the ongoing innovations that
occur within an operating plant are, on average, much larger than the innovations from the
frontier technology. In this sense, 20-year-old plants are technologically superior to their
contemporary brand-new plants.
Note that the link between the employment shares lt,s and relative productivities
¯ At,s/ ¯ At established in the proposition is derived from static ﬁrst-order conditions equating
the value marginal product across plants. These ﬁrst-order conditions hold regardless of any
changes or trends in overall employment lt. Hence, the fact that the data show trends in
manufacturing employment–increasing in the ﬁrst part of the century and decreasing in the
second part–has no bearing on our method of inferring learning from employment shares.
We use employment shares of plant cohorts to infer the amount of learning that plants
experience as they age. We also use them to infer the speed of diﬀu s i o no fn e wt e c h n o l o g i e s
as expressed in (5).
B. A Contrast with the Literature on Learning
We have argued that theory implies that learning manifests itself in the plant-speciﬁc,
or organization-speciﬁc, component of productivity can be uncovered from data on the relative
size of organizations. This approach is quite diﬀerent from that followed in much of the
literature on learning at the organizational level. (For a survey, see the 1990 work of Argote
and Epple.) In that literature, learning is measured by data on the relationship between
labor productivity at the organization level and the age or production experience of the
organization. This literature identiﬁes many instances of a very strong relationship between
the labor productivity of a speciﬁc organization and its age or production experience.
We take a diﬀerent approach for two reasons. One is that more comprehensive panel
data sets on manufacturing plants do not reveal a strong systematic relationship between
the labor productivity of these plants and their age. The other reason we take a diﬀerent
13approach is that, in the context of models like ours, such a relationship has no bearing on
the extent of learning.
In the data, a large dispersion in average productivity occurs across plants. However,
average productivity does not seem to vary systematically with plant age. For example,
Jensen, McGuckin, and Stiroh (2001) study a large panel of plants and ﬁnd that once they
include controls for labor quality and capital intensity, “surviving cohorts regardless of age or
vintage show similar (labor) productivity levels” (p. 331). Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998)
ﬁnd similar results. Bahk and Gort (1993) run regressions of plant productivity on plant
experience. Using gross sales as their measure of plant output, they ﬁnd an economically small
positive relationship between plant productivity and plant age. In particular, their regressions
imply that labor productivity grows at 15 percent over the ﬁrst 15 years of a plant’s life. To
see that this growth is economically small, note that over this 15-year period, the average
surviving plant has employment and value added growing by roughly 500 percent. Moreover,
even in Bahk and Gort’s data there may be no relationship between plant productivity and
age: when they use the theoretically preferred value-added measure rather than gross output
as a proxy for output, they ﬁnd little relation between productivity and age.
Next we show that, consistent with the data, our model implies there should be no
systematic relation between the labor productivity of a plant and its age or production
experience. The model has this implication regardless of the amount of learning assumed
at the plant level. To show this, we imagine the results we would get if we applied Bahk and
Gort’s approach to measuring learning to data generated from our model. Speciﬁcally, Bahk
and Gort run a regression of plant output on plant inputs and some measure of experience
and interpret the coeﬃcient on the experience variable as measuring the extent of learning.
Unfortunately, this approach is valid only if the movement in plants’ inputs is essentially
unrelated to their speciﬁc productivity. Theory, however, predicts precisely the opposite, as
the following example makes clear.
Consider running Bahk and Gort’s regression in a simpliﬁe dv e r s i o no fo u rm o d e l .I n
this simpliﬁed model, let all plants be competitive and make a homogeneous ﬁnal good (θ =





that relative employment in this plant is given by lit/lt = Ait/At,w h e r elt =
P
i lit is aggregate
14employment and At =
P
i Ait i st h ea g g r e g a t eo fs p e c i ﬁc productivities of all plants. Hence,
taking logs of the plant production function and substituting for Ait from lit/lt = Ait/At gives
that, in equilibrium,
logqit =l o g [ zt(At/lt)
1−γ]+l o glit. (7)
We can use (7) to calculate the coeﬃcients in the following regression, of the form used by
Bahk and Gort:
logqit = β1t + β2 loglit + β3xit,
where xit is some measure of the age or past production of the plant. This regression necessar-
ily yields estimates of β3 =0along with β1t =l o g [ zt(At/lt)1−γ] and β2 =1 . Bahk and Gort’s
interpretation of β3 =0would be that no learning takes place at the plant level regardless
of how much speciﬁc productivity Ait rises with age.
Notice also that in the equilibrium of the model, (7) implies that labor productivity
is given by qit/lit = zt(At/lt)1−γ and, hence, is constant across all plants, regardless of their
speciﬁc productivity Ait. This observation points to the key diﬀerence between the impli-
cations for learning by an individual and that of an organization, which can add variable
factors. Individuals who learn increase their labor productivity. Organizations that learn
grow by adding variable factors in order to keep their labor productivity constant (at least
with Cobb-Douglas production). Hence, we argue that the key variable to look at to deter-
mine the amount of learning (that is, built-up knowledge or organization-speciﬁc capital) is
not some measure of either labor or capital productivity, but rather some measure of relative
size.
2.3 Quantiﬁcation
To derive our model’s quantitative implications for the main features of transition to
a new economy, we need to set both the macro and the micro parameters. In the model, a
period is a year.
A. Macro Parameters
The model’s macro parameters are few and fairly standard to quantify. The growth
rate of output per hour g and the depreciation rate δ are chosen to reproduce data on the
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of manufacturing output per hour in 1949—69. We let the plant level production function be
F(k,l)=kαl1−α. Because of imperfect competition, the share of GDP paid to physical capital
is given by θγα. We use data for 1959—99 obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
national income and product accounts to set θγα =1 9 .9 percent and δ =5 .5 percent, based
on methodology described in our earlier work (Atkeson and Kehoe 2005). We set the discount
factor β =0 .993, so that the steady-state interest rate i deﬁned by 1+i =( 1+g)/β is 4.1
percent.
Now consider the parameter ν = γθ. On the basis of the work of Basu and Fernald
(1995), Basu (1996), and Basu and Kimball (1997), we choose θ =0 .9, which implies a
markup of 11 percent and an elasticity of demand of 10. The span of control parameter γ
measures the degree of diminishing returns in variable factors at the plant level. Hundreds of
studies have estimated production functions with micro data. These analyses incorporate a
wide variety of assumptions about the form of the production technology and draw on cross-
sectional, panel, and time-series data from virtually every industry and developed country.
Douglas (1948) and Walters (1963) survey many studies. More recent work along these lines
has also been done by Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992), Bahk and Gort (1993), Olley and
Pakes (1996), and Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998). This work ﬁnds that the returns to scale
in production are fairly close to 1.0, with many of the estimates falling in the range from
0.9 to 1.0. We choose γ =0 .95. This makes ν =0 .85. This value of ν is consistent with the
discussion of Atkeson, Khan, and Ohanian (1996). As we report later (in section 3.1), we did
some sensitivity analysis with respect to γ and found that with γ =0 .9 and γ =1 .0, we get
very similar results.
B. Micro Parameters
We use the method described in our 2005 work to set the micro parameters governing
plant-speciﬁc productivity. We rewrite the model so that the problem of choosing the learning
parameters governing plant-speciﬁc productivity is equivalent to directly choosing parameters
governing shocks to size. We assume that the shocks to size have a lognormal distribution, so
that log s ∼ N(ms,σ2
s). We choose the means and standard deviations of these distributions
16to be smoothly declining functions of s.I np a r t i c u l a r ,w es e tms = κ1 + κ2(S−s
S )2 for s ≤ S
and ms = κ1 otherwise and σs = κ3 + κ4(S−s
S )2 for s ≤ S and σs = κ3 otherwise. With this
parameterization, the shocks for plants of age S or older are drawn from a single distribution.
Thus, shocks to plant size are parameterized by {κi}4
i=1 and age S.
We choose the parameters governing these shocks so that the model matches data on
the fraction of the labor force employed in plants of diﬀerent age groups, as well as data on
job creation and job destruction in plants of diﬀerent age groups. We use these job statistics
to set the means and variances of shocks to productivity. The data are from the 1988 panel
of the U.S. Census Bureau’s LRD, which has the most extensive breakdown of plants by age
available.
More formally, we use the relevant statistics deﬁned by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996): Employment in a plant in year t is (lt + lt−1)/2, where lt is the labor force in year t.
Job creation in a plant in year t is lt − lt−1 if lt ≥ lt−1 and zero otherwise. Job destruction
in a plant in year t is lt−1 − lt if lt ≤ lt−1 and zero otherwise. In Figure 4, we report for each
age category these three statistics for U.S. manufacturing plants in 1988 for all plants in that
category relative to the total employment in all plants. This gives us a total of 26 statistics
from the data that we use to summarize the life cycle of plants.
We set the parameter S = 150 and choose the four parameters {κi}4
i=1 to minimize
the sum of the squared errors between the corresponding 26 statistics computed from the
model and those in the data. The resulting model statistics are also plotted in Figure 4.
The parameters that generate these shocks are S = 150,κ 1 = −0.1829,κ 2 =0 .2520,κ 3 =
exp(−1.7289), and κ4 =e x p ( −7.0134).
In Figure 4A, we see that our model matches the employment shares fairly well. In
Figures 4B and 4C, we see that our model implies a bit more job creation and job destruction
on average than are observed in the data. To get some perspective on this, note that the
implied statistics for the overall job creation and destruction rates are 8.3 percent and 8.4
percent for the data and are both 9.7 percent for the model. Note also that in annual data
during 1972—93, the standard deviations of the overall job creation and job destruction rates
are 2.0 and 2.7 percentage points. Together, then, these data reveal that the overall job
creation and job destruction rates in our model are reasonably good estimates–within one
17standard deviation–of the time-series ﬂuctuations in these rates observed in the data.
3. The Transition After the Second Industrial Revolution
Now we ask whether our quantitative model built to capture the historians’ hypotheses
about the constraints facing manufacturers in the Second Industrial Revolution can reproduce
the main features of the transition after that revolution. To answer this question, we use the
model to simulate a transition to a new economy with a permanently faster pace of technical
change, driven by faster growth in the frontier blueprints for new plants. In this simulation,
the faster growth assigned to the frontier blueprints is meant to capture the faster pace of
technical change embodied in U.S. plant design after the development of electric power.
Our transition experiment is stark in that we assume that the transition to a new
economy starts with a sudden, unanticipated, and permanent increase in the pace of em-
bodied technical change. We make this assumption in order to give a stark picture of the
transition dynamics implied by our model. We also view this assumption as in the spirit of
the work of historians Devine (1983), David (1990), David and Wright (1999), and others
who document a substantial acceleration in the pace of technical change during the Second
Industrial Revolution.
In this experiment, we ﬁnd that the model reproduces the three main features of the
transition after the Second Industrial Revolution very well. We follow that experiment with
two others, designed to investigate whether or not the details of the learning process are key
quantitatively in generating these results. We ﬁnd that they are.
3.1 The Transition Experiment
We model the Second Industrial Revolution as a permanent increase in the pace of
technical change. Speciﬁcally, consider an economy that is initially on a balanced growth path
with steady growth in the frontier blueprints causing output per hour to grow 1.6 percent
per year. This growth rate is the trend growth rate of output per hour in U.S. manufacturing
for 1869—99. We denote this initial growth rate of the frontier blueprints by gold
τ . In our
experiment, we suppose that at the beginning of the period labeled 1869, agents learn that
the growth rate of the frontier blueprints increases once and for all, so that on the new
balanced growth path, output per hour grows 3.3 percent per year (as in the U.S. data for
181949—69), an increase of 1.7 percentage points. We denote this new growth rate of the frontier
blueprints by gnew
τ . W er e f e rt ot h e s et w ob a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t h sa st h eold economy and the
new economy, respectively. We then compute the transition path of our model economy from
the old economy to the new economy in response to this exogenous increase in the pace of
embodied technical change.
In our experiment, we must set some initial conditions. We set the initial physical
capital-output ratio and the distribution of organization capital across plants to be those
from the balanced growth path of the old economy. In setting this initial distribution of
organization capital, we assume that the distributions of the shocks to speciﬁc productivity
are the same as those we used to match the U.S. micro data for 1988. Thus, in this experiment,
the stochastic process for speciﬁc productivities is held ﬁxed, whereas the growth rates of the
frontier blueprints are varied. This amounts to assuming that the process of learning about
any particular embodied technology does not depend on the rate at which new embodied
technologies appear.
Now consider our model’s implications for the three main features of the transition
which we demonstrated in section 1: the productivity paradox, a slow diﬀu s i o no fn e wt e c h -
nologies, and ongoing investment in old technologies.
Begin with the model’s implications for the path of productivity, measured as output
per hour. Figure 5 shows these implications for the period 1869—1969 together with the actual
data for this period (as seen in Figure 1). The model clearly produces a productivity paradox.
In the model, as in the data, the growth in output per hour gradually accelerates. Over the
period 1869—99, the trend growth rate in output per hour is 1.6 p e r c e n ti nb o t ht h em o d e l
and the data. Over the period 1899—1929, the trend growth rate in output per hour is 2.3
percent in the model and 2.6 percent in the data. In the model, as in the data, the growth
rate in output per hour reaches its new steady state of 3.3 percent by 1940.
A convenient summary measure of the speed of transition in our model is the number
of years it takes for the growth rate of output per hour to rise by one percentage point relative
to the growth rate of the old economy. Here it takes 50 years.
Next consider the model’s implications for the diﬀusion of new technologies. Figure 6
s h o w st h i sd i ﬀusion in the model and in the data during 1869—1939. For new technologies, we
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centage of output produced in plants with blueprints dated 1869 and later. This percentage
is also the percentage of physical capital and labor employed in plants with these blueprints.
For the data, we graph the percentage of total horsepower in U.S. manufacturing establish-
ments provided by electric motors over the same period. In this comparison, we are assuming
that in the data, plants that are driven by electric motors were built in and after 1869 and
those driven by steam and water were built before 1869. With this interpretation, our model
predicts a slow pace of diﬀusion of new technologies quite similar to that for electric motors
in the data. In the model, technologies dated 1869 and later take 46 years to diﬀuse to 50
percent; in the data, electric motors take about 50 years.
Of course, in measuring diﬀusion rates, the choice of initial dates in the data is some-
what arbitrary. To make a comparison of diﬀusion rates in the model and the data that is not
so dependent on initial dates, consider a statistic that is often used in the diﬀusion literature:
the time it takes for diﬀu s i o nt og of r o m5p e r c e n tt o5 0p e r c e n t . T h i st i m ei sr o u g h l y2 0
years (1899—1919) for electric motors in the data; it is 19 years for new technologies in the
model. Thus, either way we measure it, the diﬀusion in the model is similar to that in the
data.
Note in Figure 6 that our model produces an S-shaped diﬀusion curve for new em-
bodied technologies. It does so because of the heterogeneity across existing plants in the
knowledge that they have built up about their old embodied technologies. Plants that have
little such knowledge exit in favor of new plants early in the transition, while plants with
substantial knowledge exit only later in the transition. That the diﬀusion curve is S-shaped
is a quantitative result. The shape of this curve reﬂects the distribution of this knowledge
across plants implied by the parameters of our learning process.
Finally, consider our model’s implication for the extent of ongoing investment in old
technologies. We have data on two old technologies, water and steam. So for the model,
we consider two types of old technologies: those used in plants built before 1802, which we
identify with waterpower, and those used in plants built between 1802 and 1869, which we
identify with steam power. This dating of technologies in our model is consistent with the
work of Atack, Bateman, and Weiss (1980). They suggest that the diﬀusion of steam power
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starting in 1802 so that our model is consistent with the data on the diﬀu s i o no fs t e a mp o w e r
in 1869. That is, in 1869, roughly 67 years after it began to diﬀuse, steam power accounts
for 50 percent of output in the model and 50 percent of horsepower in the data.
In Figure 7, we graph our model’s predictions for the percentages of output produced
in plants using these old technologies from 1869 to 1939 implied by our dating scheme. We
also reproduce the U.S. data seen earlier, in Figure 2, on the fractions of horsepower derived
from water and steam power over this same time period. Clearly, in those data the fraction
derived from waterpower declined steadily from 1869 to 1939, while the fraction of horsepower
derived from steam initially increased from 50 percent to 80 percent from 1869 to 1899 and
then declined. Our model reproduces both of these patterns very well.
These results imply that in the model there is considerable ongoing investment in old
technologies for at least the ﬁrst 30 years of the transition to a new economy. To understand
this implication, note that in the model, by assumption, there are no new plants built using
either of the old technologies during this time period. Hence, all of the increase in output
accounted for by these old technologies is coming from existing plants that are growing larger
by adding capital and labor. This growth is driven by continued learning about these old
technologies.
Most of the parameters of our model are standard. The span of control parameter, γ,
and the parameters of the learning process are less standard. Here we ask how sensitive are
our results to these parameters? We ﬁrst show that our results are not very sensitive to the
choice of the span of control parameter. We then conduct experiments in the next subsection
that show that they are sensitive to the choice of learning parameters.
Consider now the span of control parameter. We redid our transition experiments with
γ = .9 and γ =1 .0 so that ν = γθ equals .81 and .9, respectively. (Recall that our initial
values were γ = .95 and ν = .85.) We found that these changes led to only slight diﬀerences
in the speed of transition. For example, with γ = .9, the transition is slightly faster: it takes
45 years instead of 50 years for the growth rate of output to increase one percentage point
and 41 years instead of 46 years for diﬀusion to reach 50 percent. With γ =1 , the transition
is slightly slower: it takes 61 years before the growth rate of output increases one percentage
21point and 58 years for diﬀusion to reach 50 percent.
3.2 Learning Experiments
Our model reproduces well the three main features of the transition to a new economy
after the Second Industrial Revolution. We ﬁnd this result remarkable given that the para-
meters of the learning process were not chosen to match any of these three features. With
our approach to measuring learning, we ﬁnd a learning process that is both substantial and
protracted. Here we conduct two experiments to show that this ﬁnding is key quantitatively
in generating our results. In our ﬁrst experiment we consider a model in which, on average,
there is no learning. In our second experiment we show that if we had used a learning process
suggested by other researchers on the basis of an alternative method for measuring learning,
our model does not reproduce the three main features of the transition.
In our ﬁrst experiment, we set average learning to zero by setting the model’s age-
dependent means of the shocks to plant-speciﬁc productivity to one (which with A0 = Aε, sets
the expected growth rate of A to zero). To get the transition to converge in this experiment,
we increase the standard deviation of the productivity shocks by a factor of ﬁve.7 With these
parameters, the model’s features of the transition to the new economy are quite diﬀerent from
those seen after the Second Industrial Revolution. Productivity and diﬀusion move swiftly
instead of slowly, and there is no ongoing investment in old technologies. It takes just ﬁve
years for the growth rate of output per hour to increase by one percentage point and only four
years for technologies dated 1869 and later to diﬀuse to 50 percent. In this experiment, with
our dating scheme, the percentage of output produced using old technologies corresponding to
steam (those dated 1802—69) starts at more than 99 percent at the beginning of the transition
and falls to less than 1 percent in the next 30 years.
Recall that we follow Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) in using data on the size of U.S.
manufacturing plants over their life cycle to infer the learning process. With this procedure,
we ﬁnd that learning is both substantial and protracted. Other researchers have not used
these data to infer learning, but rather have inferred it by using regression estimates of the
productivity of plants by age. (See, for example, the work of Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995),
Hornstein and Krusell (1996), Cooley, Greenwood, and Yorukoglu (1997), and Greenwood
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and Gort (1993).) As we have discussed above, there is not much evidence of a systematic
relationship between plant age and plant productivity. Hence, it is not surprising that the
learning processes used by these researchers imply that learning is much less substantial and
protracted than our procedure implies.
In the second experiment, we consider the implications of our model for transition when
plants have the learning process discussed by Cooley, Greenwood, and Yorukoglu (1997). We
do so by setting the age-dependent means so that, on average, A1−ν grows at 1 percent a
year for the ﬁrst 14 years and is then constant. (See the discussion of the Bahk-Gort learning
process in the work of Cooley, Greenwood, and Yorukoglu (1997, p. 476)). Also, in order to
get the transition to converge, we again increase the standard deviation of the productivity
shocks by a factor of ﬁve. In this experiment, the model’s transition to a new economy is
also fast: it takes only eight years for the growth rate of output per hour to increase by one
percentage point and only six years for technologies dated 1869 and later to diﬀuse to 50
percent. The percentage of output produced using old technologies corresponding to steam
here also starts at more than 99 percent at the beginning of the transition and falls to less
than 1 percent in the next 30 years.
The results of both of these experiments are consistent with the idea that the details
of our particular learning process are primarily responsible for this particular model’s ability
to reproduce the main features of the transition to a new economy after the Second Industrial
Revolution.
4. Lessons for Other Technological Revolutions
We have put forward an abstract model of transition that can be applied to a variety
of technological revolutions. To apply our model to the transition after the Second Industrial
Revolution, we used data on growth rates in the late 1800s to set initial conditions and data
on manufacturing plants to set the parameters of the learning process. We found that our
model with these initial conditions and this learning process could reproduce the transition
after the Second Industrial Revolution remarkably well.
David (1990, 1991) argues that the transition after the Second Industrial Revolution
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Information Technology Revolution. Here we examine what lessons can be drawn from our
model that might guide research into the similarities and diﬀerences between the transitions
after these revolutions.
To begin we discuss how to reinterpret the elements of our model so that it might be
applied to the IT Revolution. Here we follow David (1990), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and
Hitt (2002), Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2002), and others in shifting our interpretation of
the basic unit of production from a manufacturing plant to a business organization and our
interpretation of blueprints from new manufacturing technologies based on electricity to new
business practices based on information technology.
While there are clearly some qualitative parallels between the Second Industrial Rev-
olution and the IT Revolution, there are also likely to be some quantitative diﬀerences that
have important implications for the nature of transition. Speciﬁcally, our model predicts a
slow transition only if agents have accumulated through learning a large stock of built-up
knowledge of old technologies before the transition begins. For the Second Industrial Revolu-
tion we argue that agents did have a large stock of built-up knowledge about factories based
on steam and waterpower. For the IT Revolution our model will predict a slow transition
only if at the start of that revolution agents had a large stock of built-up knowledge about
business practices based on old information technologies. In this sense, our model’s main
lesson for the transition after a technological revolution is that it depends on the historical
context in which that revolution occurs.
We conduct two experiments with our model to examine which factors determine the
extent of built-up knowledge in equilibrium. In the ﬁr s te x p e r i m e n tw es h o wt h a tt h ef a s t e r
the pace of technical change in the old economy, the smaller the extent of built-up knowledge,
and hence the faster the transition after a technological revolution. In the second experiment
we show that the more protracted and substantial the learning process, the larger the extent
of built-up knowledge and the slower the transition after a technological revolution.
Our experiments suggest that the extent to which the transition after the Second
Industrial Revolution is a paradigm for the transition after the IT Revolution depends on the
extent of knowledge about business practices that business organizations had built up prior
24to the IT Revolution. Currently there is little direct evidence on the extent of such built-up
knowledge about business practices. Our model, however, does suggest data from which the
extent of built-up knowledge about business practices might be measured. We ﬁnish the
section with a discussion of these implications of our model for the measurement of built-up
knowledge.
4.1 Reinterpreting the Model
Here we reinterpret our model for the IT Revolution. We shift the basic unit of
production from a manufacturing plant to a business organization. We assume, then, that
each new business organization starts with a set of business practices that embody the current
frontier of such practices and then learns to become more productive with these practices over
time. Speciﬁcally we reinterpret our three main technological assumptions as follows.
• New business organizations embody new business practices. This assumption is mo-
tivated by the work of Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) and Brynjolfsson,
Hitt, and Yang (2002), who argue that the eﬀective use of new information technology
requires a redesign of the business organization.
• Improvements in the design of business organizations are ongoing. This assumption is
motivated by the observation that increases in computing and networking capability
h a v el e dt oa ni n c r e a s i n ga r r a yo fn e wt y p e so fb u s i n e s sp r a c t i c e sa n di sc o n s i s t e n t
with the observation of Scott Morton (1991).
• New organizations improve their practices through a period of learning. This assumption
is consistent with the work of Brynjolfsson, Renshaw, and Van Alstyne (1997) and
Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2002), who argue that the process of improving an
organization structure may involve a protracted period of learning before the payoﬀs
from this investment are fully realized.
4.2 The Transition Experiments
We now conduct two experiments which demonstrate the importance of the stock of
built-up knowledge for the speed of transition and how this stock varies with the model
parameters.
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We ﬁrst demonstrate how our model’s implications for the three main features of
transition depend on the initial pace of technical change and hence the growth rate in the old
economy. We then discuss that this relation between the pace of technical change in the old
economy and the nature of the transition in our model arises because the stock of built-up
knowledge varies with the pace of technical change.
In this experiment we conduct a series of simulations in which we vary the growth
rate in the old economy, but hold ﬁxed the assumption that growth is 1.7 percentage points
higher in the new economy than in the old. Each time we hold ﬁxed all other parameters
of the model, including the learning parameters. Implicitly, here we are assuming that the
learning process is the same one that we found for manufacturing plants.
We summarize the results of these simulations in Figure 8A. This ﬁgure shows the
number of years that pass before the growth of measured productivity has risen by one
percentage point, as well as the number of years until technologies that are new as of the
start of the transition have diﬀused to 50 percent. Clearly, as the growth rate in the old
economy increases, the extent of the productivity paradox decreases and new technologies
diﬀuse more rapidly.
It is also the case that as the growth rate in the old economy increases, there is less
ongoing investment in old technologies occurring during the transition to a new economy.
Recall that after the Second Industrial Revolution, the percentage of output produced using
old technologies corresponding to steam power rose from 50 percent to 80 percent in the ﬁrst
30 years of the transition. Here, to make our analysis of old technologies parallel to that of
steam after the Second Industrial Revolution, we report on the percentage of output produced
using technologies that are up to 67 years old at the start of each simulated transition as well
as the fraction of output produced using these same technologies 30 years later. When the
initial growth rate is 1.5 percent, the percentage of output accounted for by old technologies
rises from 42 percent to 78 percent in the ﬁrst 30 years of transition. In contrast, when the
initial growth rate is 3.5 percent, the percentage of output accounted for by old technologies
falls from 97 percent to 1 percent in the ﬁrst 30 years of transition.
Why does the model produce such diﬀerent results for these transitions, when all
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knowledge that exists in the old economy. In the model, as we increase the initial growth rate,
the diﬀusion rate of new technologies in the old economy also increases. Hence, the stock
of built-up knowledge agents have about existing technologies in the old economy naturally
decreases. With less built-up knowledge at the start of the transition, agents become more
willing to abandon old technologies in favor of new ones.
In our model, the stock of built-up knowledge is characterized by the distribution of
organization capital across productive units. A convenient aggregate measure of this stock
of built-up knowledge, relative to the frontier blueprints, is ( ¯ At/τt)1−ν. Note that the ratio
¯ At/τt is the average of the speciﬁc productivity across productive units relative to the frontier
blueprints available to new productive units. The exponent 1−ν expresses this ratio in units
of the Solow residual of a standard growth model.
How this ratio changes with growth rates can be demonstrated by the model. For
example, in our transition experiment corresponding to the Second Industrial Revolution,
this ratio was 2.23 in the old economy and only 1.25 in the new economy. Thus, built-
up knowledge was nearly 80 percent higher in the old economy than in the new. In that
transition, the initial growth rate in the old economy was 1.7 percent. In contrast, suppose
that the initial growth rate had been 3.5 percent. Then, the model implies that these ratios
would have been 1.17 in the old economy and 1.03 in the new economy, so that built-up
knowledge would have been only 14 percent higher in the old economy than in the new.
More generally, Figure 8B shows the model’s predictions for the stock of built-up
knowledge in the old and new economies as a function of the growth rate in the old economy.
Note that the stock of built-up knowledge in both economies falls as the growth rate in the
old economy increases. Comparing Figures 8B and 8A, then, we see the close link between
the stock of built-up knowledge and the subsequent speed of transition.
B. A Second Experiment
Our ﬁrst experiment indicates that our model does not produce a slow transition unless
agents have a large amount of built-up knowledge about old technologies at the start of the
transition and that there is not much built-up knowledge if the initial growth rate in the old
27economy is fast. We now show that in order to get a slow transition when the initial growth
rate is high, we need learning to be much more substantial and protracted than we found
from data on U.S. manufacturing plants.
Here we conduct a ﬁnal transition experiment in which we increase the amount of
learning in organizations by increasing the means of the idiosyncratic shocks to organization-
speciﬁc productivity by a constant factor independent of age. Recall that these shocks have
a lognormal distribution, so that log s ∼ N(ms,σ2
s). Speciﬁc a l l y ,w ei n c r e a s et h em e a no f
these shocks to m0
s = ms + ∆ with ∆ = .1133.
With this change in the learning process, we conduct the following transition exper-
iment. We suppose that the old economy starts with a relatively high growth rate of 3.3
percent and then agents suddenly learn that the growth of frontier blueprints has increased
once and for all, so that the economy grows 5 percent per year on the new balanced growth
path. The transition in this experiment is now very similar to the one we found after the
Second Industrial Revolution: it takes 49 years for the growth rate of output per hour to rise
one percentage point and 46 years for new technologies to diﬀuse to 50 percent. In terms of
ongoing investment in old technologies, we ﬁnd that technologies that are up to 67 years old
account for 51 percent of output at the start of the transition and that these same technologies
account for 81 percent of output 30 years later.
C. Inferring the Extent of Built-Up Knowledge
We have shown that in our model, the extent of built-up knowledge is critical for
generating a slow transition and that this extent of built-up knowledge varies with the initial
growth rate assumed in the old economy. While we cannot measure built-up knowledge
directly, we can ask what variables in the model vary with the initial growth rate and how
one might use these variables to infer the extent of built-up knowledge. Theory suggests
that two variables in the old economy are particularly relevant: the diﬀu s i o no ft e c h n o l o g i e s
and, depending on the application, either the life cycle of plants or the life cycle of business
practices.
In our model, the speed of diﬀusion of technologies in the old economy increases with
the initial growth rate. For example, in our simulations above, in the old economy technologies
28take 72 years to diﬀuse to 50 percent if the initial growth rate is 1.5 percent, whereas they
take only 21 years if the initial growth rate is 3.5 percent. In our Second Industrial Revolution
experiment, in the old economy technologies take 67 years to diﬀu s et o5 0p e r c e n t . A sw e
discussed above, this slow diﬀusion of steam is consistent with the work of Atack, Bateman,
and Weiss (1980), who suggest that steam took roughly 70 years to diﬀuse to 50 percent. In
the context of our model, this slow diﬀusion implies that agents had built up a large stock of
knowledge about old technologies prior to the Second Industrial Revolution.
In our model, the life cycle of plants in the old economy also varies with the initial
growth rate. As the growth rate in the old economy increases, the fraction of the labor
force employed in plants with older technologies shrinks and the fraction employed with the
newest technology increases. For example, in our simulations above, in the old economy,
when the initial growth rate is 1.5 percent, over 98 percent of the labor force is employed
in plants at least 25 years old and only .02 percent is employed in plants using the newest
technologies. In contrast, when the initial growth rate is 3.5 percent, 45 percent of the labor
force is employed in plants at least 35 years old and 2.8 percent is employed in plants using
the newest technologies. (In terms of entry and exit, note that the fraction employed with the
newest technology is the employment-weighted rate, which, at least along a balanced growth
path, is also the employment-weighted exit rate.)
In our second experiment, we demonstrated that our model could generate a slow
transition starting from a high initial growth rate if learning is much more substantial and
protracted than we found for U.S. manufacturing plants. To give a feel for the implications
of the learning process we discussed above (where we increased the mean of these shocks
by ∆ = .0908), in Figure 9 we show the distribution of employment across organizations
of diﬀerent ages implied by the model at the start of that transition. We see in this ﬁgure
that employment is concentrated in organizations using very old business practices. Here 50
percent of employment is in organizations that use business practices that are at least 67
years old. Moreover, this learning process implies a very slow diﬀusion rate of new business
practices: it takes 67 years for a new practice to diﬀu s et o5 0p e r c e n t .
These results indicate a ﬁnal lesson from our model. If our model is to account for the
slow transition following the Information Technology Revolution, then there must have been
29substantially more built-up knowledge about business practices within a given organization in
the old economy preceding that revolution than there was about production processes within
a given manufacturing plant that we measured from recent data. In the data this built-up
knowledge would correspond to a life cycle of business practices that was much longer than
the life cycle of U.S. manufacturing plants.
5. Conclusion
Many economists view the period after the Second Industrial Revolution as a paradig-
matic example of a slow transition to a new economy following a technological revolution. We
have presented a quantitative model of that transition that generates the three main features
of that paradigm: a productivity paradox, slow diﬀusion of old technologies, and ongoing in-
vestment in old technologies after that revolution. We ﬁnd that two features of the model are
particularly important in generating this result: learning must be substantial and protracted,
and built-up knowledge in the old economy must be large. We use data on the life cycle
of plants to argue that learning about plant-speciﬁc technologies is indeed substantial and
protracted. We point to the slow diﬀusion of steam before the Second Industrial Revolution
as indirect evidence consistent with the historians’ claim that manufacturers had built up a
large stock of knowledge with existing technologies before that revolution.
We are not able to apply the model in the same way to the eﬀects of the more recent
IT Revolution because of the lack of data needed to measure learning and built-up knowledge.
But the model has given us some insight into how that transition may diﬀer. Our experiments
suggest that a transition to a new economy after a major, sustained increase in the pace of
technical change will not always be slow, as it was after the Second Industrial Revolution.
The speed of transition will depend on the existing rate of technical change. The transition
will be fast when the pace of technical change is already quite fast.
Clearly, then, no simple analogy exists between the transition after the Second Indus-
trial Revolution and the transition that we should expect after the Information Technology
Revolution. Instead, the main lesson from our theory is that the nature of the transition after
the Second Industrial Revolution depends in an important way on its historical context: it
came at a time when the pace of embodied technical change was relatively slow.
30Of course, before any deﬁnitive analysis of the impact of the Information Technology
Revolution can be ﬂeshed out in a quantitative model such as ours, at least three issues
must be addressed: Where are the new technologies embodied? How long is the period of
learning after they are adopted? And how much built-up knowledge do existing organizations
have with their current technologies? (See the work of Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) for
some discussion of these questions.) With regard to information technologies, none of these
questions are easy to answer quantitatively, but we have suggested how theory can be used
to address these questions.
31Notes
1Throughout the study, we take as given the standard view expressed by historians
(like David 1990) that there was in fact a sustained increase in the rate of technical change
which began in the Second Industrial Revolution and continued for many decades afterward.
This view, together with the data on manufacturing productivity, leads many observers to
conclude that there was a productivity paradox after the Second Industrial Revolution. Our
objective is to quantitatively assess whether our model of growth and technology diﬀusion
can account for this productivity paradox as well as the associated diﬀusion patterns of new
and old technologies. An alternative approach, which we do not take, is to argue that the
historians are mistaken: the pace of technical change did not increase until several decades
after the Second Industrial Revolution and, hence, there is no productivity paradox. An
important issue such an approach would have to confront is how to generate the observed
patterns of diﬀu s i o no fn e wa n do l dt e c h n o l o g i e s .
2For a more detailed discussion of the links between the historical analyses and our
model, see Atkeson and Kehoe (2001).
3Note that we do not assume that all new technologies are embodied in new plants. In
fact, our model is consistent with the idea that most of the ongoing technical change in the
economy is driven by either disembodied technical change or technical change embodied in
other factors, such as capital goods or labor.
4Since our model has a ﬁxed number of managers and each manager can either start
a new plant or operate an existing plant, our assumptions imply that on a balanced growth
path, the number of plants is ﬁxed. An alternative assumption, pursued by Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993), is that instead what is ﬁxed is the cost in terms of consumption goods of
starting a new plant. In that alternative model, the number of plants grows over time.
We have chosen our speciﬁcation because it seems to be a good approximation to
the data. Sands (1961) reports that over the period 1904—47, the number of manufacturing
plants in the United States grew only 0.5 percent per year while output per manufacturing
establishment grew nearly 3.0 percent per year. Clearly, most of the growth of output in this
period came from more output from each plant and only a small part from an increase in the
number of plants.
325Our approach diﬀers from that of a large literature which models speciﬁc productivity
as endogenous. An advantage of our approach is that it allows us to match the process
for productivity associated with learning directly to data on the growth process of plants.
Moreover, at least in a steady state, we need not take a stand on whether this productivity
is derived from active or passive learning, matching, or ongoing adoption of new technologies
in existing plants. Outside of a steady state, however, we are implicitly assuming that the
learning process does not vary with the growth rate of the economy.
6Here and throughout this study, our microeconomic data are taken from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s LRD on manufacturing plants. This data set is described in Davis, Halti-
wanger, and Schuh (1996). We use data on employment, job creation, and job destruction
from the 1988 panel of the LRD, which we obtained from John Haltiwanger’s Web site,
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/haltiwanger.
7We need to increase the standard deviation in order to generate a smooth transition.
If the standard deviation is too small, then the distribution of organization capital across
plants becomes lumpy during the transition, and that introduces oscillatory dynamics.
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Figures 1–2    A Gradual Transition to a New Economy
Figure 1    A Slow Increase in Productivity Growth . . .
Log of Output per Hour and Trend Growth in U.S. Manufacturing, 1869–1969





























Figure 2    . . . . And Slow Diffusion of Electric Power
Percentage of Total Horsepower from Three Sources of Mechanical Drive

















Figure 3    The Life Cycle of Plants in the Model 
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Figure 4    The Model’s Reproduction of U.S. Data on  
  Employment, Job Creation, and Job Destruction 
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Figures 5–7    The Model's Reproduction of the Gradual Transition to a New Economy
Figure 5   A Slow Increase in Productivity Growth . . . 



























Figure 6    . . . A Slow Diffusion of New Technology . . .
Model's Predicted % of Output Produced in Plants with New Blueprints (1869 or later)


















Figure 7    . . . And Ongoing Investment in Old Technologies 
Model's Predicted % of Output Produced in Plants with Blueprints Dated 1802–1869 (Steam) and Before 1802 (Water)
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Figure 8   Initial Growth Rates Matter for . . .
A.  . . . The Speed of Transition . . .
Model's Predictions, with Various Initial Steady-State Growth Rates, for the Time 
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B.  . . . And the Stock of Built-Up Knowledge 
Model's Predictions, with Various Initial Steady-State Growth Rates, for 
the Amount of Built-Up Knowledge, (Ā/τ)
1−ν, in the Old and New Steady StatesSource of data: U.S. Census Bureau’s 1988 Longitudinal Research Database
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Figure 9    The Distribution of Employment With More Substantial Learning
Cumulative Distribution of Employment by Age of Plants or Organizations
Data: U.S. Manufacturing Plants
Model: Organizations with
More Substantial Learning